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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of board diversity has received an unusual amount of attention
in recent years as corporations face an increasing amount of pressure to add
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more women to their boards.' In 2017, State Street Corporation, the world's
third-largest asset manager, made headlines when it announced its board
gender diversity campaign by placing a statue of the Fearless Girl staring
down the Charging Bull of Wall Street in New York City's Financial
District.2 At the beginning of 2020, Goldman Sachs announced that it would
require companies it helps take public to have at least one diverse board
member, with a focus on women. Both Twitter and Facebook experienced
social media shaming after going public without any women on their boards.
More recently, the office-sharing company WeWork was in the news for
announcing its plans to go public with an all-male board.3  In 2018,
California also made headlines when it became the first state in the country
to enact a landmark board diversity law, Senate Bill (SB) 826, which requires
public corporations headquartered in the state to have a minimum number of
female directors on their boards.4 Other states are already following
1. While there are many other forms of diversity that are relevant in this context,
this Article focuses on gender diversity because board diversity efforts from investors
and legislators have overwhelmingly focused on gender diversity. This Article does not
address well-documented racial and ethnic diversity issues facing corporate America.
2. Institutional investors now own 70% of U.S. public companies, and they have
become more vocal about what hey want from boards. Institutional investors like State
Street Global Advisors and Black Rock Inc. are putting pressure on companies with all-
male boards to add women. In some cases, they are withholding votes for directors at
companies that do not nominate a slate of diverse directors. The Evolving Boardroom:
Signs of Change: PWC's 2018 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, PWC,
https://www.pwc.es/es/publicaciones/consejos-y-buen-gobierno/pwc-annual-corporate-
directors-survey-20 18.pdf.
3. See Leslie Picker & Deirdre Bosa, We Work Doesn't Have a Single Woman
Director, According to IPO Filing, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.coms/2019/08/14/wework-doesnt-have-a-single-woman-director-
according-to-ipo-filing.html. Following public outrage, WeWork announced plans to
add one woman to its all-male, seven-member board. Joshua Franklin, IPO Hopeful
We Work Adds Woman to Board, CEO Returns $5.9 Million, After Backlash, REUTERS
(Sep. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wework-ipo/wework-adds-woman-
to-its-board-ahead-of-ipo-after-backlash-idUSKCN 1VP 1ES.
4. SB 826 adds two sections to the California Corporations Code and only applies
to publicly traded corporations in the state. It requires publicly traded domestic
corporations and publicly traded corporations that have their principal executive offices
in California, regardless of the state in which they are incorporated, have a minimum of
one woman on their board of directors by the end of 2019. By the end of 2021,
corporations with five directors must have at least two women directors, while
corporations with six or more directors must have at least three women directors. S.B.
826, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Ca. Corp. Code § 301.3 (West 2018). According to the
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, shortly
before the law was enacted, 79% of California companies did not meet the 2021
standards. See Howard Dicker, Lyuba Golster & Erika Kaneko, Mandated Gender
494
FEMALE BOARDROOM
California's lead; Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Michigan are
either considering or have passed similar legislation.5
In addition to states and investor groups, federal legislators, regulators,
and national securities exchanges are also pushing board diversity initiatives.
Several disclosure-based proposals are currently under consideration by the
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services,6 and Representative Carolyn
Maloney, Chair of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Investor Protection,
Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, introduced the Diversity in
Corporate Leadership Act of 2019.7 In February 2019, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) released new Compliance and Disclosure
Interpretations, requiring companies to explain how they factor diversity into
Diversity for Calfornia Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 18/10/18/mandated-gender-diversity-for-california-
boards/.
5. In May 2019, the Illinois House passed a bill based on California SB 826 that
would require all publicly held boards to have a woman, a Latino person, and an African
American person on their boards by the end of 2020. See Kathy Gurchiek, Report:
Diversity on Boards Growing Slowly but Steadily, Soc'y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT.
(Jun. 13, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/behavioral-compet
encies/global-and-cultural-effectiveness/pages/report-diversity-on-boards-growing-
slowly-but-steadily.aspx. The Illinois Senate subsequently revised the bill by removing
the requirement for minority and female representation and instead replaced it with a
diversity disclosure requirement. H.B. 3394, 101th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019).
In May 2019, Maryland signed legislation effective Oct. 1, 2019 that urges nonprofits
and privately held and publicly traded corporations doing business in the state to have a
minimum of 30% female directors on their Boards by the end of 2022. S.B. 911, 439th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019). A new bill was introduced in New Jersey at the
beginning of 2019 that would require many public companies based in the state to have
at least three women on the board by 2021. S. 3469, 2l8th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019).
The Massachusetts bill would require that by the end of 2021, all publicly held
corporations with principal executive offices in Massachusetts have at least one female
director on their boards, and by the end of 2023, depending on the size of the board it
must have two or three women. S. 1879, 19lth Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). A bill
introduced in the Michigan Senate would require publicly held corporations with their
principal executive offices in Michigan to have a minimum number of female directors.
S.B. 115, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019).
6. See Diversity in the Boardroom: Examining Proposals to Increase the Diversity
of America's Boards: Hearing on H.R. 281, H.R. 1018, and H.R. 3279 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019). [hereinafter Diversity in the Boardroom
Hearing]
7. See H.R. 3279, 116th Cong. (2019). The proposed legislation would, in part,
require the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish a Diversity
Advisory Group to study and make recommendations on strategies to increase gender,
racial, and ethnic diversity among the members of the board of directors of issuers of
public securities.
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nomination decisions and other company policies." In June 2019, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) announced the launch of the NYSE Board
Advisory Council, which is tasked with connecting diverse candidates with
companies seeking new directors.
The push for improved gender diversity in the boardroom is part of a
broader, reinvigorated women's movement of the past several years.
Women are driving a renewed movement for equality and leading a
transformation in American civic life that challenges the patriarchal culture
in the workplace and in leadership generally.9 In particular, the 2010s have
birthed several powerful female-led movements that advocate for equal
opportunities and a greater representation of women in leadership across
industries and sectors.'0 The cultural ripple effects of #MeToo-fueled
8. See SEC Advisory Comm. on Small & Emerging Companies,
Recommendation Regarding Disclosure ofBoard Diversity (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-021617-coporate-
board-diversity.pdf.
9. Some historians and advocates have termed this evolution of the feminist
movement as "Fourth-Wave Feminism." See Kira Cochrane, The Fourth Wave of
Feminism: Meet the Rebel Women, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/fourth-wave-feminism-rebel-women.
10. In 2013, Sheryl Sandberg's book Lean In encouraged women to "lean in" to
claim their place as C-suite business leaders. It became a best-seller and launched a
movement for workplace equality. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMVEN, WORK,
AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013). In 2016, Hillary Clinton became the first female
presidential nominee of a major U.S. political party and by doing so, carved a path for
the record number of women running for the 2020 Democratic nomination. See Carrie
Dann, Hillary Clinton Becomes First Female Nominee of Aajor U.S. Political Party,
NBC NEWS (Jul. 26, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-
conventions/hillary-clinton-becomes-first-female-nominee-major-u-s-political-
n617406. In 2017, millions of people stormed the streets following the inauguration of
Donald J. Trump as part of The Women's March, the largest single-day protest in
American history. See Women's Alarch, HISTORY (Jan. 21, 2017),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/womens-march. The #MeToo movement
went viral in late 2017 and sparked a national conversation about workplace sexual
harassment. See Mary Pflum, A Year Ago, Alyssa Milano Started a Conversation About
#AdeToo. These Women Replied, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/year-ago-alyssa-milano-started-conversation-about-metoo-these-women-
n920246. At least two hundred prominent men lost their jobs following #MeToo
allegations, and Time magazine named "The Silence Breakers" as the 2017 "Person of
the Year." See Audrey Carlsen et al., The Men Who Have Been Replaced, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2019/04/05/metoo/metoo-
A14.pdf; see also Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards,
The Silence Breakers, TIME (2017), https://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-
silence-breakers/. In 2018, women ran for political office in unheard-of numbers and
won a record number of seats in the U.S. Congress. See Heather Caygle, Record-breaking
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uprisings and the record number of women winning in the midterm elections
compelled many commentators to call 2018 another "Year of the Woman.""
Female empowerment movements are changing societal norms, shifting
workplace power dynamics, and laying the groundwork for greater gender
equity both inside and outside of the boardroom.
Board diversity initiatives and laws are being enacted at a time when men
still outnumber women in the most prestigious leadership positions in
corporate America.12 Nationally, women only make up 22% of C-Suite
Number of Women Run for Office, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com
/story/2018/03/08/women-rule-midterms-443267. In 2019, the U.S. Women's National
Team won the Women's World Cup soccer championship game, which gave rise to
widespread public support for the team's equal pay demand and for female athletes
generally. See Anna North, Fhat's Next for the US Women's Soccer Team and Their
Fight for Equal Pay, Vox (Jul. 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/10/
20686692/us-womens-soccer-team-parade-equal-pay.
11. The first "Year of the Woman" was in 1992 when twenty-eight women were
elected to Congress, nearly doubling the number of women in the House of
Representatives. See The Year of the Woman, 1992, US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES (last visited May 22, 2020), https://history.house.gov
/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Essays/Assembling-Amplifying-
Ascending/Women-Decade/; see also Adam Clymer, The 1992 Elections: Congress
The New Congress; Democrats Promise Quick Action on a Clinton Plan, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 1992). Many commentators cite Anita Hill's 1991 appearance at the
confirmation hearing of then-Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas as the triggering
event. See Sarah Pruitt, How Anita Hill's Testimony Made America Cringe And
Change, HISTORY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.history.com/news /anita-hill-
confirmation-hearings-impact.
12. Note that the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions is not
limited to the corporate sector. In the legal profession, women are 45% of associates but
only 22.7% of partners and 19% of equity partners. In academia, women are only 32%
of full professors and 30% of college presidents. Women represent only 24% of members
of Congress. Women accounted for just 18% of all the directors, executive producers,
producers, writers, cinematographers, and editors who worked on the top-grossing 250
domestic films of 2017. See Comm'n on Women in the Profession, AM. BAR Ass'N, A
Current Glance at Women in the Law (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/women/a-current-glance-at-women-in-the-law-jan-
2018.authcheckdam.pdf; Heather L. Johnson, Am. Council on Educ., Pipelines,
Pathways, and Institutional Leadership: An Update on the Status of Women in Higher
Education 2017, https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/HES-Pipelines-Pathways-and-
Institutional-Leadership-2017.pdf; Results: Women Candidates in the 2018 Elections,
RUTGERS CTR. FOR AM. WOMAN AND POL. (Nov. 29,2018), http://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/
default/files/resources/resultsrelease_5bletterhead5d_1.pdf; Martha M. Lauzen, The
Celluloid Ceiling: Behind-the-Scenes Employment of Women on the Top 100, 250, and
500 Films of2017 (2018), https://womenintvfilm.sdsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01
/2017 Celluloid Ceiling Report.pdf.
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executives,13 and women account for about one-fifth of board directors in the
country.'4 In other words, a staggering 99% of boards are majority male. At
the start of 2018, 585 companies in the Russell 3000 still had all-male
boards,15 and only 28% of Russell 3000 companies have women holding at
least one-fifth of their board seats.16 Board diversity is also a problem among
newly public companies. Nearly 40% of recent IPO companies had no
women on their boards at the time they went public.'7 Representatives on
both sides of the political aisle seem to agree that the underrepresentation of
women in corporate America is a problem that needs to be addressed.'
The underrepresentation of women in these positions is not due to a lack
of educational attainment. Today, women comprise more of the college-
educated workforce and since the 1980s, have been earning a higher
percentage of advanced degrees than men, but the leadership gender gap
persists.19 In fact, men and women enter the workforce in roughly equal
13. Rachel Thomas et al., Women in the Workplace 2018 at 5, Mckinsey & Co.
Company (2018), https://wiw-assets-production.s3.us-east 1.amazonaws.com/pdfs/
women in the workplace_2018_print.pdf.
14. Bonnie Marcus, What Role Does Political Correctness Play In Corporate
Board Diversity?, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonnie
marcus/2018/10/29/what-role-does-political-correctness-play-in-corporate-board-
diversity/#374f4d5a5556.
15. Amit Batish, Equilar Gender Diversity Index: Ql 2018, EQUILAR (May 9,
2018), https://www.equilar.com/reports/55-gender-diversity-index-ql-2018.html. The
Russell 3000 Index tracks the performance of 3,000 of the largest U.S.-traded stocks,
which represent about 98% of all U.S incorporated equity securities. James Chen,Russell
3000 Index, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 22, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r
/russell_3000.asp.
16. Inst. Shareholder Servs., Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the World,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world/.
17. James Cheap, Board Classification and Diversity in Recent IPOs, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2018/04/24/board-classification-and-diversity-in-recent-ipos/.
18. See, e.g., Diversity in the Boardroom Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Rep.
Patrick McHenry) ("Pursuing diverse boards is the right thing to do as a matter of
economic interest."); id. (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters) ("Strong diversity in the
boardroom is critical to continued U. S. competitiveness and to ensuring that consumers
of all backgrounds are served and not excluded").
19. Women earn more than 57% of bachelor's degrees, over 59% of master's
degrees, and 53% of doctorate degrees. Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting
Institutions, by Level of Degree and Sex of Student: Selected Years, 1869-70 Through
2021-22, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (June 2012), https://nces.ed.gov/programs
/digest/dl2/tables/dtl2_3 10.asp?campaignid=10&instanceid=10628&segment id=1
4853&user id=9057472ac769b04e9b634aa2632c5970&regiid=86995897. Women 25
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numbers, but data shows that at the senior-management level, men
outnumber women two to one.20 Even in industries such as healthcare and
retail, where women significantly outnumber men in the workforce, men still
dominate the senior-level positions.2 1 Where men and women are equally
qualified, the low percentage of women on boards and in senior-management
positions represents an enormous loss of talent and educational investment.
The presence of women on America's corporate boards has undoubtedly
increased over the last decade.22 While the traditional obstacles faced by
women going up the corporate ladder have become surmountable for some
women, the route to the boardroom still contains a variety of barriers for
most women.23 In fact, corporate governance experts predict that at the
current rate of change, it could take nearly four decades before corporate
boardrooms match the approximately half-female workforce.24
years and older make up 50.2% of the college-educated work force. Richard Fry, U.S.
Women Near Milestone in the College-Educated Labor Force, PEW RES. CTR. (June 20,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/20/u-s-women-near-milestone-
in-the-college-educated-labor-force/.
20. Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies, CATALYST (May 1, 2019)
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-sp-500-companies/.
21. Michelle Stohlmeyer Russell et al.,, Women Dominate Health Care Just Not
in the Executive Suite, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.bcg.com
/publications/2019/women-dominate-health-care-not-in-executive-suite.
22. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES INT'L, INC., Board Monitor US 2019 at 4 (2019),
https://www.heidrick.com/-/media/Publications-and-Reports/Board Monitor US 2019
.ashx (stating that in 2009, women filled 18% of new board seats, while in 2018, women
filled 40% of new board seats); Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data
on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV.
579, 582 (2006) (stating that from 1994 to 2004, there was a 20% increase in companies
in the Fortune 1000 reporting at least one woman on their board); Deb DeHaas et al.,
Missing Pieces Report: The 2018 Board Diversity Census of Women and Minorities on
Fortune 500 Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 19/02/05/missing-pieces-report-the-20 18-board-
diversity-census-of-women-and-minorities-on-fortune-500-boards/ (finding that women
and minorities have made more progress in board representation for the Fortune 500
between 2016 and 2018 than between 2012 and 2016).
23. There are significant racial and ethnic differences in the rate of women's
advancement. For example, there are just two women of color CEOs of Fortune 500
companies. Julia Carpenter, Forget the 'Glass Ceiling.' Women of Color Face a
'Concrete Ceiling', CNN MONEY (Aug. 8, 2018), https://money.cnn.com
/2018/08/06/pf/women-of-color-ceos/index.html. Women of color are only 4.7% of
executive- or senior-level officials and managers in S&P 500 companies. Judith Warner
et al., The Women's Leadership Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/11/19121654/WomensLeadersh
ipFactSheet.pdf.
24 IJ S GOV'T ACCOTINTABTLTY OFFICE GAO-16-30 CORPORATR BOARDS:
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Research clearly shows that laws mandating a minimum level of female
board representation are effective at causing companies to add female
directors to their boards at the rate required by those laws.25 On the other
hand, countries without board gender diversity mandates tend to have less
gender-diverse boards than countries with such laws.26 Recognizing the
success of such mandates in many European countries,27 California and other
legislatures considering board diversity legislation seek to use the same
approach to diversify America's corporate boardrooms. However, these so-
called "gender quotas" face considerable criticism and legal challenges in
the United States.28
SB 826's quota mechanism faces a serious equal protection constitutional
hurdle to its implementation in the United States.2 9 The first of - what
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS (2015); Boards Will Reach Gender Parity in 2055 at Current Pace,
EQUILAR (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/212-boards-will-reach-gender-
parity-in-2055.html.
25. Following the passage of SB 826, the percentage of female directors per firm
affected by the law rose by 3.4%. Green et. al. Do Board Gender Quotas Affect Firm
Value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826 (2019). In countries that have an
average of three women on large company boards, all but one country also have
government-mandated quotas. See Jeff Green, Women Get Board Seats Mostly When It's
Required by Law, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-12-1 1/women-get-corporate-board-seats-mostly-when-it-s-required-by-
law. See also infra Part V.
26. A notable exception is Sweden, whose public companies average more than 30%
female directors but do not operate under a quota system. See Zineb Raji, Gender
Diversity in Corporate Senior Management: Glass Ceiling Yet to be Cracked, VIGEO
EIRIS (Mar. 2018), https://30percentclub.org/assets/uploads/UK/ThirdParty
Research/Gender-diversity-in-senior-corporate-managment.pdf.
27. The use of gender quotas for boards has been implemented in at least eighteen
countries for certain companies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Switzerland, and South Africa. Susan Franceschet & Jenifer M. Piscopo, Equality,
Democracy, and the Broadening and Deepening of Gender Quotas, 9 POL. & GENDER
310, 311 (2013). See Vanessa Fuhrmans & Alejandro Lazo, Calfornia Moves to
Mandate Female Board Directors, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/california-moves-to-mandate-female-board-directors- 153 557 1904 (noting that
the number of women on boards in Italy, Germany and several other European nations
has tripled and, in some cases, quadrupled in recent years); Gender Parity on Boards
Around the World, supra note 16 (finding that the mandate in Norway has resulted in an
average of 42% of seats on Norwegian boards being held by women in 2016).
28. See Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming, 99 B.U. L. REv. 1435, 1445-1447
(2019) (summarizing the critiques of California's quota).
29. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate
Boardroom: The Inevitable Failure of Calfornia's SB 826 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp.
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commentators predict will be many - legal challenges to SB 826 have
already been filed.3 0 This Article does not analyze the merits of the equal
protection concerns raised by other commentators, but it instead aims to
address such concerns by putting forth a different strategic approach to
instituting a gender diversity mandate.
This Article proposes taking gender diversity mandates out of the hands
of state regulators and into the realm of the national securities exchanges.
Specifically, this Article proposes the implementation of gender diversity
listing standards by the major national securities exchanges that would
require publicly traded companies to have a minimum number of women on
their boards.3 ' Mandatory gender diversity measures via listing standards is
Governance at Stan. U. Working Paper Series No. 232, Sept. 12, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3248791; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
California Corporate-Board Quota Law Unlikely to Survive a Constitutional Challenge,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wlf.org/2018/10/02/wlf-legal-
pulse/california-corporate-board-quota-law-unlikely-to-survive-a-constitutional-
challenge/; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Board Diversity in the News Again,
Kimberlydkrawiec.org (Sept. 1, 2018), http://kimberlydkrawiec.org/board-diversity-in-
the-news-again; CalChamber Bill Positions, CAL. CHAMBER OF COM.,
http://ctweb.capitoltrack.com/public/search.aspx?t=bill&s=SB826&go=Search&sessio
n= 17&id=ldae9efb-651d-4a02-a05d-360ca7965bl4 (last visited Sept. 3, 2019). Some
have also questioned the legality of SB 826 under the Commerce Clause. See Vikram
David Amar & Jason Mazzone, Part Three on California's Mandate That Women Be
Placed on Corporate Boards: Dormant Commerce Clause and Improper Government
Purpose Questions, VERDICT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://verdictjustia.com/2018/11/01/part-
three-on-californias-mandate-that-women-be-placed-on-corporate-boards.
30. Notably not a single corporation that was compelled to comply with SB 826 has
filed suit. On August 6, 2019, the conservative government watchdog Judicial Watch
filed a lawsuit in Los Angeles County Superior Court on behalf of three California
taxpayers to block California from implementing SB 826, alleging that the gender-based
quota is unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Complaint at 1-2, Crest v.
Padilla, No. 19ST-CV-27561 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2019). The second lawsuit was
filed on November 13, 2019 by a shareholder of OSI Systems, Inc., a publicly traded
company that is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California. Complaint at
1-2, Meland v. Padilla, No. 19-cv-02288 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019). The court dismissed
the complaint for lack of standing on April 20, 2020.
31. A listing standard is a requirement for listed securities established by a stock
exchange in order to promote liquidity and transferability of shares by increasing investor
confidence in both the markets and listed issuers. Listing standards are typically
quantitative standards focused on indicators such as total number of stockholders,
average monthly trading volume, aggregate market value, and annual revenue. See
Equity Rules Manual, NASDAQ (2019), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com
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the most effective and constitutionally feasible way to increase the number
of women directors in this country. The proposed listing standards would be
based on best practices guidelines, formulated with input from various
stakeholders, and allow for differences among listed companies.
Part II of this Article describes how the governance of publicly traded
companies is regulated, and specifically, the unique role securities exchanges
play in regulating corporate governance matters. Listing standards adopted
by exchanges impose a layer of regulation on public companies beyond state
corporate law and federal securities law. The exchanges also offer certain
benefits over state and federal regulation of public companies. The stock
exchanges are capable of moving more quickly than state or federal
regulators should the business environment change or if adjustments to the
exchanges' listing standards are required. Listing standards also allow for
flexibility and experimentation across a wide variety of corporate boards and
avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating public company boards.
Finally, listing standards offer public companies predictability and
consistency over a patchwork of state corporate laws.
Part II also discusses the important influence of norms on the development
of corporate law. It details the new norms that are emerging around greater
gender equity inside the boardroom as a result of the efforts of various
investor groups and gender diversity advocacy groups. This Article's listing
standard proposal aims to bring regulation of board governance in line with
this new reality.
Part III of this Article examines the economic justification for gender
diversity on corporate boards. Public companies have accumulated
significant power and influence in our economy and society relative to other
stakeholders. They are the largest drivers of wealth creation in our economy;
they yield considerable influence over our country's elections; the location
of their operations determines the vitality of our country's cities and towns;
and they create products and technologies that have revolutionized our day-
to-day lives. Good governance is central to healthy companies and in turn,
a healthy economy and society. Diverse boards are more effective and
perform better than homogenous boards. From an economic perspective,
there simply is no business case for a homogenous board.32
BE9Fl7057DFO%7D--WKUS TAL_5667%23teid-0. Other listing standards focus on
corporate governance matters such as the number of independent directors on a board
and the mandate for an audit committee comprised of independent directors. Listing
standards are subject to SEC authorization.
32. Multiple studies have shown that women provide different values and bring
different professional experiences than men, which can enhance board decision-making
and performance. They engage in better decision-making processes, provide better
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Part IV explores two primary reasons why gender diversity efforts to date
have not resulted in significantly more women on corporate boards. First,
there is low turnover among corporate directors, and as a result, boards have
few vacancies in any given year for new directors.33 When a seat opens,
companies prioritize prior board experience in the election of new directors
and find candidates from within current board members' largely male-
dominated networks.34 Since women have historically been excluded from
boardrooms in large numbers, the number of women who have prior board
experience or are within the necessary networks is limited. Second, women
continue to face structural barriers and discrimination in the workplace,
hindering their ability to reach leadership positions. Gender stereotypes and
implicit biases are hard to overcome through voluntary efforts. In fact,
voluntary diversity measures and increased transparency efforts have proven
to not be strong enough to considerably improve the gender diversity of
corporate boards.
The issue of defining the most effective approach to improving gender
diversity on corporate boards is squarely presented at this time given
changing societal norms around gender equality in the workplace and in
leadership positions. Part V of this Article analyzes the proposed gender
diversity listing standard, addresses potential legal challenges it may face,
and concludes that it is the most appropriate response to current governance
needs articulated by various corporate stakeholders. A gender diversity
listing standard would promote good governance among issuers and signal
corporate responsibility and accountability to shareholders.
Ultimately, this Article's listing standard proposal aims to formalize the
oversight, and drive better corporate outcomes. See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily & Dan R.
Dalton, Women in the Boardroom: A Business Imperative, J. BUS. STRATEGY 8, 9 (2003);
Sabina Nielsen & Morten Huse, The Contribution of Women on Boards of Directors:
Going Beyond the Surface, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 136, 143 (2010); Amy J. Hillman et
al., Women and Racial Minorities in the Boardroom: How Do Directors Differ?, 28 J.
MGMT. 747, 758-59 (2002); Val Singh et al., Newly Appointed Directors in the
Boardroom: How Do Women and Men Differ?, 26 EUR. MGMT. J. 48, 49, 59-7 (2008);
Stephen Bear et al., The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender Composition on
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. BUS. ETHIcS 207, 217
(2010).
33. See Anne Stych, Low Turnover Slows Diversity on Corporate Boards,
BIZWOMEN (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-
news/2019/04/low-turnover-slows-diversity-on-corporate-boards.html?page=all.
34. According to research from the Boardlist, a company that facilitates the
placement of women on boards, 95% of board placements are the result of networking.
See Marcus, supra note 14; Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 1449 (noting that the
nominating committees of company boards are dominated by men, making it difficult
for purely private action to generate structural transformation in corporate leadership).
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country's changing norms around gender parity in leadership while avoiding
the legal challenges faced by California's state-level gender diversity
mandate (and other state legislation modeled after it). Further, the proposal
would expedite the pace at which public companies increase board
participation by women compared with efforts to date by Congress, the SEC,
investor groups, trade associations, other stakeholders, and the exchanges
themselves. In order to achieve gender parity in boardrooms across America,
it must be mandated.
II. REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance broadly describes the structure, processes, and
procedures by which companies are directed and controlled.35 Regulators
and investors care about corporate governance because it impacts corporate
performance, which in turn, affects the health of the economy.36 Public
companies in this country control billions of dollars, and they are capitalized
in large part by the contributions of middle-class investors to retirement
accounts, pension funds, college-savings plans, and mutual funds.3 7
Corporations rely on their reputations with respect to corporate governance
in part to induce investors to capitalize their enterprises.
In the United States, publicly traded corporations maintain a system of
governance characterized by the separation of ownership and control. The
three primary constituencies involved in corporate governance are
shareholders, directors, and officers.38 Under the prevailing view of
35. See The Fin. Aspects of Corp. Governance (Cadbury Comm.), Report Comm.
on the Fin. Aspects of Corp. Governance 1, 16 (1992), https://ecgi.global
/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (noting that the responsibility of a
board includes determining a company's strategic aims, as well as the leadership to
execute them, and supervising the management of the business and reporting to
shareholders on their stewardship).
36. See Ellen Florian, One Bright Spot in the WeWork Debacle: Turns out Investors
Actually Care About Corporate Governance, FORTUNE (Sept. 25, 2019)
https://fortune.com/2019/09/25/wework-adam-neumann-we-co-corporate-governance-
investors/ (describing how the market has suffered due to poor decisions in governance).
37. A Federal Reserve Board study found that in 2016, 51.9% of families owned
stocks, either directly or as part of a fund. The study also f und that about one-third of
families in the lower half of the income scale had stock holdings. In the next 40% of the
income scale, about 70% of households held stocks, while households in the top 10% of
the income scale had stock ownership rates above 90%. See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes
in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 103 FED. REs. BULL. no. 3 (Sept. 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/20 17-September-changes-in-us-family-finances-from-20 13 -to-20 16.htm.
38. Control blocks of stock owned by families, corporate groups, banks, and the
government are more common in Europe and Asia.
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corporate governance in the United States, a corporation should be governed
for the benefit of shareholders.39
Shareholders are owners of the corporation, but they do not have any right
to manage the day-to-day business of the corporation. Shareholders ely on
corporate governance mechanisms to bridge the gap between their ownership
of and lack of control over large public companies. Shareholders holding
stock with voting rights have the right to elect directors to the board.40
The board of directors is the highest governing body within a corporation
and serves both a monitoring role and a leadership role.4' As monitors, the
board provides oversight over management and corporate activities. As
leaders, the board acts on behalf of shareholders to make corporate policy
decisions and advise on strategic and operational issues facing the
corporation. Board directors have fiduciary duties to protect shareholders'
assets and ensure that the corporation maximizes hareholder value.42 The
39. In other countries, especially those in Europe, other stakeholders such as
workers, customers, suppliers, and communities are central to corporate governance
norms. Note that the shareholder-centric norm in the United States may be starting to
shift to a broader stakeholder group. One of the U.S.'s most powerful business lobbying
groups, The Business Roundtable, released a statement in August 2019 signed by more
than 180 chief executives of the largest American companies titled "Business Roundtable
Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote an Economy that Serves All
Americans." It is the first time in its nearly fifty-year history that the group has said
shareholder value is not the first priority. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose
of a Corporation to Promote "An Economy That Serves All Americans", BUS.
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-round
table-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-
americans (stating that the CEOs commit to lead their companies for the benefit of all
stakeholders - customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders).
40. Typically, the nominating committee of the board of directors recommends the
election of a director for each open board seat. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ require
that the nominating committee be comprised of independent directors. The nominated
directors are listed on a proxy statement hat is sent to each shareholder. At the annual
shareholder meeting, shareholders may either vote for the nominated director or abstain
from voting. Alternately, shareholders may nominate their own candidates to the board
via a process known as a proxy contest. Shareholders are responsible for preparing and
distributing their own proxy materials. See Equity Rules Manual, supra note 31; Listed
Company Manual, supra note 3 1.
41. State corporation codes generally provide that a corporation's business and
affairs be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016)
(stating that "all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction, and subject o the oversight, of the board of directors.").
42. The purpose or goal of the corporate form is almost universally conceived as
profit maximization. But see Lynn A. Stout, Lecture and Commentary on the Social
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board also appoints the chief executive officer, who, together with other
officers, runs the daily operations of the corporation. When people think
about who leads a company, they typically focus on the chief executive
officer (CEO), but the CEO serves at the pleasure of the board and is an agent
of the corporation whose duties are defined by the board. Accordingly, the
board plays a critical role in the leadership of the corporation.
The governance of a public company is guided by a complex framework
of legal and non-legal factorS43 that determine how decisions are made, how
power is exercised, and the extent to which interests of various corporate
stakeholders are considered. State corporate law, federal securities law,
listing standards, and norms are the major pieces of the corporate governance
framework for public companies.
State corporate law is the primary source of corporate governance rules
and supplies the basic scaffolding for decision-making that occurs within a
corporation. State corporate codes, the common law, and the governance
documents of each company provide for the allocation of corporate power
among the three groups of internal constituents described above:
shareholders, directors, and officers.4 Because corporations are generally
free to incorporate in any state without limiting their ability to do business
in other states, corporations ultimately choose what state corporate law will
govern their internal affairs.5 State corporate law does not focus upon the
Responsibility of Corporate Entities: Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1195-99 (2002) (noting that the obligation to
maximize shareholder value is the subject of considerable debate among corporate
scholars).
43. See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 961, 966
(2003) (listing the many non-legal factors that influence corporate governance: the
various markets, including the market for shares, the products market, the market for
executives, and the market for corporate control; private ordering such as incentive
contracts for various participants or monitoring, including that provided by directors and
independent accountants; and norms, including the collective impact of business culture
and groups that promote best corporate practices).
44. Delaware places all corporate power in the board of directors. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 14 1(a) (stating that all corporate power should be exercised by or under the
direction of the board of directors).
45. The internal affairs doctrine asserts that only the state in which a corporation is
incorporated, as opposed to the state in which a corporation primarily operates or holds
its assets, should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs. Delaware
is the most popular state for corporate charters largely based on reliance on the internal
affairs doctrine and the perceived desirability of its corporate governance laws.
Corporate scholars have questioned the legality of SB 826 under the internal affairs
doctrine and argue that SB 826 is invalid as applied to corporations not incorporated in
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public market for securities and its related needs, interests, and issues.
Federal securities laws provide a separate layer of corporate governance
regulation over public companies and regulate the issuance of securities.46
The SEC was created in the aftermath of the Great Crash of 1929 and during
the ensuing Great Depression, as a way to restore public confidence in the
capital markets and thereby promote economic recovery. The SEC is also
the federal agency that has oversight authority over stock exchanges. The
primary sources of federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and regulations
promulgated by the SEC under those acts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 also impose a variety of substantive corporate governance
requirements.
Because this Article's proposal primarily concerns the other two legs of
the corporate governance framework-listing standards and norms-they
are discussed in turn below.
A. US. Exchange-Established Listing Standards
Even before there were federal securities laws, stock exchanges regulated
the corporate governance of public companies.8 Stock exchanges operate
California under the internal affairs doctrine. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 29, at 1-4.
46. Note that state statutes known as "blue sky laws" also regulate securities. The
blue sky laws vary from state to state, but each state's blue sky laws contain a registration
requirement for securities that will be sold in that state. The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 preempts state regulation of securities registration and offering
process for securities listed on NYSE or NASDAQ. See National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 18(a)(1B) 110 Stat. 3416.
47. The SEC is primarily responsible for administering six major securities laws:
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (2019); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78qq (2019); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
77aaa-77bbbb (2019); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64
(2019); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to -18 (2019); and
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-65 and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (2019)).
Through the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has primary
responsibility for implementing the disclosure obligations of listed companies in the
SEC. See SEC What We Do (June. 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov
/Article/whatwedo.html.
48. See, e.g., NYSE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE (Steven A. Rosenblum et al.
eds. 2014), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE CorporateGovern
anceGuide.pdf (describing how in 1895, the NYSE recommended that listed companies
issue a full report of their annual operations at least fifteen days before the shareholder
meeting. In 1899, it began requiring regular financial statements of all listed companies.
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as markets for the purchase and sale of an issuer's shares and serve as
regulators of the markets they create.49 The two predominant and most
prestigious U.S. financial securities markets are the NYSE and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ).
The NYSE is the oldest and largest stock exchange in the world by market
capitalization.50 Over 3,100 companies are traded on the NYSE, including
some of America's largest companies such as Target, Disney, Coca-Cola,
and McDonald's. NASDAQ is the second-largest stock exchange5' in the
world by market capitalization, with over 3,500 companies listed on the
exchange. In addition to a variety of consumer goods companies and health
care companies, many of America's largest technology companies, such as
Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon are traded on NASDAQ.
Together, NYSE and NASDAQ account for the majority of the securities
listed for trading on U.S. stock exchanges and thus hold considerable power
over the governance standards of public companies in this country.
Because the operation of successful securities markets depends on the
integrity of the listed companies and the equitable treatment of shareholders,
each of the security exchanges establishes a set of contractual rules or "listing
standards" that regulate the issuers of securities traded on those exchanges
and the securities that are listed for trading.5 2 Listing standards are designed
It urged listed companies to have at least two outside directors on their boards starting in
1956. In 1977, NYSE required that listed companies have independent audit committees
comprised of outside directors.) Over the last decade, the xchanges have workedjointly
to issue new corporate governance standards.
49. Stock exchanges are commonly referred to as self-regulatory organizations
(SROs). All securities transactions that do not take place on the stock exchange occur in
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. The exchanges offer listed securities greater
liquidity and prestige than the OTC market. See Special Study Grp. of the Comm. on
Fed. Regulation of Sec., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1491, 1502, 1531 (2002).
50. The NYSE began as a member-owned SRO, but it demutualized in 2006.
Demutualization is the process by which a stock exchange converts from a nonprofit,
member-owned entity into a for-profit corporation owned by shareholders. The sources
of revenue for a stock exchange include listing fees, trading transaction fees, and sale of
information services and market data. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at
Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2550, 2554 (2006).
51. NASDAQ initially operated as a quotation service and was a wholly owned for-
profit subsidiary of the nonprofit National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. It spun
off in 2000 and converted into a shareholder-owned market. It began issuing public stock
in 2002.
52. Under the Exchange Act, stock exchanges are required to self-regulate by
establishing rules that regulate listed companies, brokers, dealers, and other market
participants. Note that the SEC is also authorized to impose listing standards, but the
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to promote share liquidity and market stability by increasing investor
confidence in both the exchange market and the companies that are listed.53
Exchanges have strong incentives to adopt listing standards that benefit
investors because their incomes rise when more investors purchase securities
listed on their exchanges. Companies that are seeking access to the public
markets are incentivized to list with an exchange that attracts the most
investors.4 Some of the listing standards are prerequisites to listing a
security on the exchange and others are rules applicable after an issuer's
shares are already listed. An exchange may remove or de-list the company's
stock from the exchange if the company fails to meet the exchange's listing
standards.
The listing standards vary by exchange, but they are generally categorized
as (i) quantitative standards uch as minimum numerical thresholds for
market capitalization, revenue, and number of shares, and (ii) internal
structure standards such as the requirement for an audit committee comprised
of independent directors. The latter requirements are considered corporate
governance listing standards, and they effectively mandate that listed
companies meet a baseline level of "corporate responsibility, integrity and
accountability to shareholders."56 Corporate governance listing standards
reflect the exchanges' conception of good governance practices and serve as
quality indicators to investors.57 By assuring investors that its issuers are
scope of SEC authority to directly impose listing standards is limited to matters in
furtherance of the Exchange Act. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 414 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). Some commentators have argued that listing standards are not designed to
protect shareholders and markets but instead function as marketing campaigns by the
exchanges. See Douglas C. Michael, The Untenable Status of Corporate Governance
Listing Standards under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAw. 1461, 1462 (1992).
53. See Fleckner, supra note 50 at 2546 (providing liquidity is one of the critical
functions of a stock exchange).
54. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1457-
1458 (1997) (stating "[a]s a provider of liquidity, an exchange competes with other
exchanges and over-the-counter markets, both to attract companies to list and to induce
investors to purchase listed securities").
55. See Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate
Governance, supra note 49, at 1516 (noting that delisting for noncompliance is rare, so
exchanges tend to encourage compliance through negotiation with listed companies or
by imposing sanctions, including fines).
56. See Listed Company Manual, supra note 31.
57. Some commentators have argued that in the competitive market for listings,
exchanges have considerable incentives to under-regulate issuers to attract more firms.
Regulation imposes costs on companies, and if the costs are high enough, companies
may choose to list on another exchange. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen
O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN.
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practicing proper governance, exchanges are, in a way, mitigating the
financial risk to investors purchasing shares on their exchanges and making
the exchanges more attractive to investors.
Although listing standards are enforced through a private contract between
a listed company and an exchange, the process of developing a listing
standard involves a public discussion. Corporate governance listing
standards are considered "rules" for purposes of the Exchange Act.
Accordingly, they must be adopted pursuant to Section 19 of the Exchange
Act and are subject to SEC approval. In particular, Section 19(b) outlines
the process by which an exchange can propose a new listing standard. First,
the exchange must file a copy of the proposed listing standard with the SEC
for publication.59 The SEC will then solicit comments from the public on
the proposed listing standard. Following the comment period, the SEC must
approve the proposed listing standard if it finds that the proposed listing
standard is "consistent with the requirements of' the Exchange Act.60 On
the other hand, the SEC must disapprove a proposed listing standard if it is
unable to find that such standard is consistent with the Exchange Act.6 1
The "consistency" standard provides exchanges with substantial
autonomy to adopt corporate governance listing standards.62 Business
Roundtable v. SEC63 is the sole judicial interpretation of SEC authority over
corporate governance listing standards.64 The court reviewed a voting rights
L. REv. 563, 580 (2005).
58. Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act)
describes the process for the adoption of exchange listing standards. Section 19(b)
outlines the process by which exchanges can propose new rules or amend existing rules,
and Section 19(c) provides the SEC with certain direct authority to unilaterally amend,
delete, or add to the listing standards of an exchange. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 19 (2019) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
59. See id at § 19(c)(1).
60. See id. at § 78s(b)(2) (emphasis added).
61. See id.
62. Nothing in the Exchange Act prohibits an exchange from regulating corporate
governance through its listing standards, nor does the Exchange Act contemplate the
SEC performing a merit review of the proposed listing standards. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Revisiting the One Share/One Vote Controversy: The Exchange's Uniform
Voting Rights Policy, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 175, 183 (1994) (concluding that "the SEC
effectively must rubberstamp" listing standard proposals).
63. 905 F.2d. 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
64. The issue in Business Roundtable was whether the SEC had exceeded its
jurisdiction when it promulgated a regulation impacting the rules of SROs under
Exchange Act Rule 19(c)-4. See id. at 409. While the Article's proposal is focused on an
exchange-established rule under Exchange Act Rule 19(b), court dicta on the scope of
SEC authority over invalidating listing standards promulgated by an exchange is
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standard promulgated by the SEC and invalidated it because it was not
consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act. In the opinion, the court
specifically found the scope of SEC authority to be "quite limited" with
respect to disapproving proposed listing standards related to corporate
governance matters.65 The consistency standard has been interpreted to
mean the requirement that proposed corporate governance listing standards
not be "designed to permit unfair discrimination" among issuers.66 In other
words, the SEC must approve proposed corporate governance listing
standards as long as it is satisfied that any differences in the application of
the listing standards are based on meaningful distinctions between issuers
and are not unfairly discriminatory.
Exchange-established corporate governance listing standards have long
served as an alternative to government regulation of public companieS67 and
relevant.
65. See Special Study Grp. of the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Special Study
on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487,
1524 (2002) (citing Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d. at 414). The report also noted that the
SEC's authority to approve a governance standard is limited, but the limitations are not
defined. See id. at 1554. See generally Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
351 (1963) (commenting that Congress did not intend for The Exchange Act to displace
"the exchanges' traditional process of self-regulation. The intention was rather, ... one
of 'letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role.
Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well-oiled,
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used . . ."').
66. Note that consistency standard has not been judicially interpreted with respect to
corporate governance listing standards, but a Task Force for the American Bar
Association found the nondiscrimination standard to be the only restriction on an
exchange's authority to adopt corporate governance listing standards under the
consistency standard. See Special Study on Market Structure Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 1520 n.160 (stating that "[("[S]tructure and
content of listing agreements between exchanges and issuers are, except for questions of
'unfair discrimination' among issuers, outside the scope of the [SEC's] oversight and
regulatory jurisdiction" (citing Comment Letter from the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Task Force on
New York Stock Exchange Listing Requirements, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC,
at 4 (Dec. 31, 1986)))). The report also described how courts have interpreted the
consistency standard and how the standard applies to corporate governance listing
standards. Sections 6(b)(5) and 15(b)(6) generally require that rules of an exchange be
designed "to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices" and "to protect
investors and the public interest." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78f(b)(5) (2019); see also Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 1518-1520, n.158.
67. The efficacy and appropriateness of the exchange-method of regulation is a
source of great debate among scholars. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997); Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of
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in the context of this Article's proposal, are preferable to direct federal or
state regulation of corporate governance in the following ways.
Jurisdiction While exchanges are subject to SEC oversight, they are
ultimately private entities. As private entities, exchanges are able to develop
rules in areas where government entities lack jurisdiction as long as they
comply with applicable securities laws. For example, the SEC cannot
directly regulate the corporate governance of listed companies,68 but the
exchanges can mandate compliance with its rules.6 9 Most relevant to this
Article's proposal, the exchanges are also able to regulate in areas where
state entities may face constitutional restrictions.70
Coordination American corporate law is comprised of the statutes and
judicial decisions of fifty-one separate jurisdictions. States have not
voluntarily coalesced around a single approach to matters concerning the
internal affairs of a corporation.1 Publicly traded companies typically
Corporate Governance Listing Standards under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS.
LAW. 1461, 1462 (1992); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 964-
65 (1999); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399-401 (1998).
68. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412 (finding that corporate governance
regulation is beyond the purview of the Exchange Act). But see Jeffrey Y. Wu, Revisiting
Business Roundtable and Section 19(c) in The Wake ofthe Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 249, 250 (2006) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley has implicitly expanded the
SEC's rulemaking authority under Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act).
69. See Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance through the
Market: Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom, 27 J. CORP. L. 341, 360 (2002) (stating that "The NYSE closes this gap in the
federal law by mandating compliance with its corporate governance standards."). See
also Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance,
supra note 65, at 1490 (stating that "Corporate governance listing standards fill, at least
in part, the sizeable gap between state corporate law and the federal securities laws").
70. See infra Part V.A.
71. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California 's "Women on
Boards" Statute and the Scope ofRegulatory Competition, EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 8 n.
51 (forthcoming 2019), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=3077&context=facultyscholarship. Note that California and Delaware hold differing
views on the scope of the internal affairs doctrine. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never found that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally mandated. See ERIN A.
O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009) (asserting
that the doctrine does not have "special constitutional status"); Jeb Rubenfeld, State
Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause: The "Foreign" Corporations Problem,
36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 357 (1988) (analyzing and rejecting arguments that the internal
affairs doctrine is compelled by the Commerce Clause); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory
Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
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operate in multiple states, engage in substantial interstate commerce, and
have geographically dispersed shareholders. As a result, the laws applicable
in one state may affect the corporation's activities in other states.72 Listing
standards satisfy the need to coordinate applicable governing law to facilitate
interstate markets and provide clear guidance to corporations where state law
diverges or does not address a governance matter applicable to listed
companies.73  In the context of the Article's proposal, without a single
mandate, publicly traded corporations might be forced to comply with the
board diversity laws of all potentially relevant states, which can increase the
cost of conducting interstate commerce and effectively limit new entrants
into the market.
Flexibility Compared with state or federal regulation, listing standards
are more flexible, allow for more experimentation, and avoid a one-size-fits-
all approach to regulating corporate governance. Corporations do not have
uniform needs or abilities with respect to implementing corporate
governance standards. Through listing standards, exchanges may establish
special rules, exempt smaller companies, or offer a phased-in approach as
needed.
Speed The exchanges can implement regulations more quickly than state
or federal regulators. Demutualized, or for-profit, exchanges are run as
CoRP. L. 57, 75 (2009) (stating that "[u]nder modem law the [internal affairs doctrine]
is best understood merely as a choice of law regime").
72. Examples where one state's laws impact corporate activity in other states include
state anti-takeover statutes, state "corporate outreach" statutes, and the internal affairs
doctrine.
73. Even if federal legislation did not explicitly preempt state law in this area,
corporations would adapt in the way they have done with respect to director
independence standards. The standards under Sarbanes-Oxley, NASDAQ, and NYSE to
determine whether a director is independent differ from Delaware law, and it is possible
for a director to be independent under one standard and not under Delaware law. While
these director independence rules regulate a corporation's internal affairs and could
conflict with the state of incorporation's law on the same issue, the corporations to which
these requirements apply have responded by changing their structure to reflect these
rules. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 71, at 14 n.90. This response has positive
implications for a corporation's ability to comply with a gender diversity listing standard
in the face of state gender diversity mandates. Unlike the director independence rules,
there is no conflicting standard under Delaware law with which publicly traded
corporations based in California would have to contend.
74. Scholars refer to this issue as a regulatory spillover problem. See Erin O'Hara
O'Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111
MICH. L. REv. 647, 660 (2013) (explaining the "spillover" problem and its costs). Note
that the enforceability of the internal affairs doctrine in this context has been the subject
of recent debate.
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businesses and can make decisions quickly through their board of directors
and officers. While the implementation of new listing standards is subject
to SEC approval, the comment period prior to approval is relatively short.
Expertise-The xchanges have the industry experience and proximity to
market actors necessary to proactively anticipate challenges and potential
impacts of corporate governance regulation on the marketplace. Their
expertise in this area is an asset to designing and implementing corporate
governance rules that are effective and tailored to market participants.76
B. Norms
Norms such as prevailing industry and community standards play an
important role in shaping corporate governance practices and influencing
how business are run. Norms are a reflection of the views held by most
people and often serve as the basis for formalizing those views into law and
regulation. Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg explained the influence of
75. All rule proposals are subject to a thirty-five day comment period prior to
approval though the SEC has the ability to extend the comment period to ninety days.
At the end of the comment period, the SEC must either approve the proposed rule or
initiate proceedings to evaluate whether the rule should be disapproved. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (2019).
76. See Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance through the
Market: Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom, 27 J. CORP. L. 341, 349 (2002) (stating that "Many governmental regulators
are experts in shaping regulatory policy, but may lack the industry experience necessary
to appreciate the true impact of a new law on the marketplace.").
77. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1269 (1999) (stating that "while social norms differ from legal rules, there is often
a symbiotic relationship between legal rules and social norms . . . legal rules are often
based on social norms . . .adoption of a legal rule that is based on a social norm sends a
message that the community regards the norm as especially important"); Inst.
Shareholder Serws. Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the World, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-
parity-on-boards-around-the-world/ (discussing how social norms in various markets
often drive the regulatory framework, and how that regulatory framework is fulfilled).
Examples of corporate norms shaping corporate governance practices include reports
from The Business Roundtable, The Conference Board, and ABA Task Force. See, e.g.,
Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, https://www.businessround
table.org/policy-perspectives/corporate-governance/principles-of-corporate-govemance
(last visited Mar. 31, 2020); Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private
Enterprise, Findings and Recommendations, https://www.conference-board.org/pdf
free/SR-03-04.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
78. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 33 (2008) ("Norms are important because they are often the source of actual
legal rules"). See Eisenberg, supra note 77 at 1265 (noting that some corporate law
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norms on corporate law especially well:
"Adoption of a legal mle that is based on a social norm sends a message
that the community regards the norm as especially important. This
message increases both the likelihood that the norm will be internalized
and the reputational penalties for violating the norm. Furthermore, legal
mles add, to the force of a specific obligational norm, the force of the
general norm of obedience to law, which is one of the most powerful
norms of our society. Legal mles may also serve to clarify social norms
by providing focal points for their meaning."79
The sources of new norms are primarily found outside of the courts;o in
many cases, new norms are a result of campaigns of civil society groups that
work to change public opinion and practice.1 As Professor David Cole
outlines in his book Engines of Liberty, the public acceptance of marriage
equality was incubated by activists long before the Supreme Court declared
it a constitutional right, as was the recognition of the individual right to bear
arms and the human rights of foreign prisoners of war in the war on terror.8 2
A similar process is now occurring with respect o women's fight for equality
in the workplace.8
doctrines explicitly incorporate social norms such as ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance); Burke, supra note 76 at 371-73 (comparing the differing cultural factors
between the U.S., Canada, and U.K. and how such factors result in various approaches
toward regulated entities in each country); DUNCAN GREEN, How CHANGE HAPPENS 49
(2016) (noting that norms set "standards that national movements can use to rally for
change in legislation and in public attitudes on everything from whether bribery is
acceptable or parents have the right to beat their children, to discrimination against
migrant workers. . . .").
79. See Eisenberg, supra note 77 at 1269-70.
80. See Eisenberg, supra note 77 at 1264 ("social norms may shift when, and
because, enough actors change their behavior that a tipping-point is crossed"); Green,
supra note 78 at 52 ("'Critical junctures', such as wars or political and economic crises,
can help shift norms, when an upheaval in traditional routines opens the door to new
thinking. In the US, the experience of blacks and whites fighting alongside each other in
the Second World War helped galvanize the civil rights movement. Increased attention
to inequality in recent years suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have changed
attitudes.").
81. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO
MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (2016) ("Look behind any significant judicial
development of constitutional law, and you will nearly always find sustained advocacy
by multiple groups of citizens, usually over many years and in a wide array of venues.").
82. See id. at 81 (examining the role civil society groups such as Freedom to Marry,
the National Rifle Association, and the Center for Constitutional Rights have played in
transforming public opinion on these issues from provoking outrage to being broadly
accepted rights).
83. See David A. Katz et al., Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism
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Throughout history, women's movements have translated mass collective
action into political, social, and economic change. Most recently, the 2017
Women's March, the largest single-day demonstration in U.S. history,
heralded a new wave of women's activism that has been sustained by the
#MeToo movement and the political organizing that resulted in historic wins
for women in the 2018 mid-term elections. Galvanized women are
recognizing their power to change norms.
The normative expectations of women's roles in corporate America have
undergone extraordinary change over the last century, largely thanks to
women's movements and the work of civil society groups. Today, several
grassroots campaigns and advocacy organizations are helping shift norms
inside corporate boardrooms from male-dominated to gender-diverse. For
instance, 2020 Women on Boards is a national campaign to increase the
percentage of women on U.S. company boards to at least 20% by the year
2020,4 and the Thirty Percent Coalition is a national organization that is
committed to the goal of women holding 30% of board seats across public
companies.5 Another private sector initiative, Every Other One, is backed
by the Committee for Economic Development and aims to increase gender
diversity on U.S. boards by getting companies to appoint a woman to every
other vacant board seat.8 6
The effectiveness of these groups' efforts is evidenced by the broader and
growing support of gender diverse boards among the country's largest
investors. In 2017, State Street Corporation issued proxy voting guidelines
Is the Next Phase of# MeToo, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance and Fin. Reg., (Sept.
28, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 18/09/28/corporate-governance-update-
shareholder-activism-is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ (explaining that "[a]s the #MeToo
movement continues to make itself felt in all facets of American life ... many boards
have overseen the addition of anti-harassment policies to corporate codes of conduct, the
establishment of procedures for addressing allegations, and the enhancement of
employee training at all levels. Directors are taking proactive steps toward educating
themselves and looking deeply into issues involved, and many have highlighted it as a
priority for the senior management eam. Boards that have successfully installed ...
good governance in this area can now ... consider the larger project of gender equality
in corporate America, in which sexual harassment, corporate culture, gender pay equity,
and gender diversity are related issues.").
84. See 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://2020wob.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 4,
2019).
85. See THIRTY PERCENT COALITION, Who We Are, https://www.30percentcoalition
.org/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
86. See Comm. for Econ. Dev., CED Unveils "Every Other One" Initiative, PR
NEWSWIRE (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ced-unveils-
every -other-one-initiative-28255607 1.html.
87. According to proxy advisory firm ISS's Governance Principles Survey, the
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designed to diversify the boards of companies in which it invests.
BlackRock, the world's largest asset manager, released new proxy voting
guidelines in 2019, stating that it expects to see at least two women directors
on each of its portfolio companies' boards.89 California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS), one of the largest pension funds in the
country, launched a board diversity plan in 2017, announcing it would
withhold votes against existing directors who sit on U.S. company boards
without diverse board members.90 More recently, the Midwest Investor
Diversity Initiative, a group of eleven pension and union funds with a
collective $750 billion in assets, launched an effort to persuade small and
mid-sized companies in the Midwest to adopt diverse board candidate search
policies with the goal of having such companies add more women and people
of color to their boards.91 The views of institutional investors are particularly
influential as a source of governance norms, given that such investors make
up the majority of the shareholder base of most publicly traded companies.92
majority of investors (61%) and non-investors (55%) agree that board gender diversity
is an essential attribute of effective board governance regardless of the company or of its
market. Effective for annual meetings on or after February 1, 2020, ISS will recommend
against the election of the nominating committee chair at Russell 3000 and S&P 500
companies where there are no women on the board. Lyuba Goltser & Elisabeth
McMorris, Heads Up for the 2020 Proxy Season: ISS Survey Results May Signal Policy
Changes, JD SuPRA (Sept. 13, 2019), https://wwwjdsupra.comlegalnews/heads-up-for-
the-2020-proxy-season-iss-65833/. See also Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder
Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S.
CAL. L.R. 101, 121 (Forthcoming 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssm.com/
abstract=3439516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.3439516 (arguing that index funds
have demanded gender diversity on the boards of large companies in large part to attract
the assets of Millennials, a generation that places a premium on social values in their
investments).
88. See State Street Global Advisors, 2017 Global Proxy Voting and Engagement
Guidelines (Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-
social-governance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf.
89. See Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities,
BLACKROCK (Jan. 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet
/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.
90. See Arleen Jacobius, CalPERS turns Turns Focus to board diversity in proxy
Board Diversity in Proxy Voting, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180917/ONLINE/19091861/calpers-tums-focus-to-
board-diversity-in-proxy-voting.
91. See Jeff Green, A $750 Billion Midwest Fund Group Pushes for Board
Diversity, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-08-13/a-750-billion-fund-group-targets-midwest-s-white-male-boards.
92. See Charles McGrath, 80% ofEquity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425
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In this context, we are seeing a shift in workplace power dynamics, and
new norms are emerging around greater gender equity inside the
boardroom.93 When stock exchanges formulate corporate governance listing
standards, they look to prevailing industry and community norms as their
primary reference point.94 As discussed in Part V, listing standards should
reflect such changes in corporate norms and reinforce emerging norms
around gender equity in the boardroom.
III. THE BUSINESS CASE AGAINST HOMOGENEITY
There are three main normative justifications for imposing a gender
diversity mandate on corporate boards: economic, individual fairness, and
societal public interest. The economic justification is that increasing the
number of women directors will improve corporate governance, which will
lead to better corporate performance. The individual fairness justification is
that as a matter of fairness, equally qualified women should have the same
access as men to opportunities that yield economic power. The societal
public interest justification relies on the argument that more gender-balanced
boards are important for democratic legitimacy, achieving equality, and
creating a fairer society. This Article focuses on economic justifications
because they appear more prominently in the U.S. conversations on board
gender diversity, where shareholder primacy is still the dominant model.
Effective corporate governance plays a central role in the proper
functioning of companies and hinges to a large degree on the strength of the
board. Since the early 2000s, and following a series of major corporate
scandals and the financial crisis, prevailing views about the characteristics
of a strong board have changed dramatically.95 Congress passed the
/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions (noting that
institutions own about 78% of the market value of the Russell 3000 index and 80% of
the large-cap S&P 500 index).
93. See Claire A. Hill, #MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and Profit
Maximization, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 895, 895-96 (2019) (observing that shareholder
activism is increasingly focused on "boys club" cultures at workplaces and companies
are beginning to address issues salient to gender equality in corporate America such as
gender diversity on boards).
94. See MACEY, supra note 78, at 33.
95. In the wake of the highly publicized Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals in
the early 2000s, exchanges have come to play a central role in promulgating the corporate
governance requirements of public companies. Congress and the exchanges focused
their attention on the corporate governance practices of public companies to maintain
investor confidence in the markets. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 focused on
strengthening the requirements for director and auditor independence. See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,96 and the exchanges issued a new set of
corporate governance listing standards aimed at improving the board's
oversight function, decision-making, and overall performance.9 7  The
reforms did not include any diversity mandates despite research showing
more diverse boards are more effective at reducing risk, monitoring the
management eam, and decision-making.9 8 Research also shows that more
gender-diverse boards in particular outperform predominantly male boards
on a range of board functions and corporate performance indicators.99 The
remainder of Part III summarizes the research on the effects of board
diversity on corporate performance and board function.
For decades, gender-diversity advocates have argued that gender diversity
is good for business and by increasing diversity, a corporation's bottom line
would improve. In fact, many empirical studies show a correlation between
greater gender diversity and business performance.00 For example, the
96. See id.
97. New NYSE listing standards required a majority of independent directors and
the audit, compensation and nominating governance committees only be comprised of
independent directors. Sarbanes-Oxley defined a new broader responsibility for
corporate officers, including requiring them to certify financial statements and that the
company has a system in place to fairly present its results. See id. at § 401(a)(i); see also
Report ofthe New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards
Committee (June 6, 2002), http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/resource/nysegovf.pdf
(citing "increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging
conflicts of interest" as the justifications for the reforms).
98. See infra discussion and text accompanying notes 111-115.
99. See infra discussion and text accompanying notes 104-115.
100. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Diversity on Corporate Boards: Limits of the Business
Case and the Connection Between Supporting Rationales and the Appropriate Response
ofthe Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 887, 888 (2011); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited:
New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 858 (2011) (outlining the various
empirical studies establishing a positive relationship between board diversity and
improved financial performance along a variety of financial metrics). A study of the
boards of FTSE-listed companies found that operational performance and share prices
were both higher in the case of companies where women made up over 20% of board
members than those companies with lower female representation. Yilmaz Arguden,
Why Boards Need More Women, HARV. Bus. REV. (June 7, 2012), https://hbr.org
/2012/06/why-boards-need-more-women. Gender-balanced leadership teams were
21% more likely to experience above-average profitability than companies with the least
gender-balanced teams, according to a McKinsey Report. See Delivering Through
Diversity, McKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/
McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Organization/Our%/o2Olnsights/Delivering%20throug
h o20diversity/Delivering-through-diversity full-report.ashx. Companies with the
highest representation of women on their senior teams reap 34% more profits than
companies with the lowest female representation according to study by Catalyst. The
Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity, CATALYST
2020] 519
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 28:4
Credit Suisse Research Institute found that from 2005 to 2011, the shares of
companies with at least one woman on the board outperformed those without
any women.'0 Analysis from Harvard's School of Public Health ranked
Fortune 500 companies by the number of women directors present on their
boards and found those in the highest quartile had a 42% greater return on
sales.102 Federal reserve economists analyzing the performance of 90 U.S.
bank holding companies found that banks with more gender diversity on
their boards perform better.103
However, critics attack the adequacy of such studies, noting that
correlation does not establish causation and also cite studies showing
negative correlations.0 4  There is also a body of research finding no
causation between greater gender diversity and improved profitability and
stock performance.05 What this research and critics of mandatory board
diversity efforts fail to address are the potential negative effects of
homogeneity on board performance. The sense of comfort that people feel
in a homogenous group comes at a cost; homogenous groups have less
objective judgment and more blind spots in their decision-making.106
(2004), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads /2019/01/TheBottomLine_
ConnectingCorporatePerformanceandGenderDiversity.pdf/.
101. See Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance, CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST.
(Jul. 31, 2012), https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/media-
releases/42035-201207.html.
102. See Lois Joy et al., The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women's
Representation on Boards, CATALYST (Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/TheBottomLineCorporatePerformanceandWomensR
epresentation on Boards.pdf.
103. See Ann L. Owen & Judit Temesvary, Gender Diversity on Bank Board of
Directors and Performance, FED. RES. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/econres/notes/feds-notes/gender-diversity-on-bank-board-of-directors-and-
performance-20190212.htm.
104. See Fairfax, supra note 100, at 862 (highlighting studies showing negative
correlation between board diversity and firm value).
105. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L.
REV. 795, 810 (2005).
106. The effects associated with homogeneity include lack of accuracy in processing
information and an absence of objectivity in making decisions. Psychologists call this
phenomenon "groupthink." See Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching
for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in
Organization Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 414 (1996). One study revealed
that all-white juries made more factually inaccurate statements and considered a
narrower range of information during jury deliberations than did racially diverse juries.
See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
520
FEMALE BOARDROOM
Decades of social science research shows that diverse groups are more
innovative at solving complex, non-routine problems-the exact types of
problems that boards are tasked with providing strategic input on-than
homogeneous groups. 107
Gender diversity on boards changes behaviors, decisions, and director
interactions. The presence of women directors on boards can improve how
boards function and enhance the quality of discussions.0 Research suggests
that women exercise more due diligence,109 are more reflective,"10 and may
be more effective at dealing with risk, a key function of a corporation's
board."' Another study found that public companies with more women on
their boards have fewer governance-related scandals and have higher
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 597, 606-07 (2006). In another study, researchers
asked traders to price stocks in simulated markets. The participants were placed in either
ethnically diverse or homogenous teams. Traders who were part of the diverse teams
were 58% more likely to price stocks correctly, whereas those in homogenous groups
were more prone to pricing errors. David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams
Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://leadersforgood.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/HO38YZ-PDF-ENG.pdf (citing Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic
Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PNAS 18,524 (2014)).
107. This is not only because people with different backgrounds bring new
information, but simply interacting with individuals who are different forces groups to
prepare better, anticipate alternative viewpoints, and expect hat reaching consensus will
require effort. See Katherine W. Philips, How Does Diversity Make Us Smarter, SCI.
AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-
us-smarter/.
108. A 2010 study published in Science provides evidence that "collective
intelligence" generally increased when women made up a greater proportion of the
group. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sarah White, Wanted: Female Corporate
Directors, 29 PACE L. REV. 249, 287-88 (2009) (summarizing findings by social
psychologists that women "communicate and make decisions differently than men in
ways that may be more compatible with the complexity and uncertainty inherent in
turbulent environments").
109. Boards with a higher number of female directors are more likely to ask top-
ranked financial advisers for help in assessing the price at which their companies will
sell in a takeover offer. See Maurice Levi et al., Are Women More Likely to Seek
Advice than Men? Evidence from the Boardroom, 8 J. RISK FIN. MGMT. 127, 134
(2015).
110. See Jennifer Miner Knippen & Trevor A. Foulk, Univ. Va., Ruminating at
the Top: Exploring the Effects of Gender Bias on Strategic Choice, Academy of
Management Conference (Nov. 30, 2014).
111. See Linda-Eling Lee et al., Women on Boards: Global Trends in Gender
Diversity on Corporate Boards, MSCI (Nov. 2015), https://www.msci.com
/documents/10 1 99/04b6f646-d63 8-4878-9c61-4eb91748a82b (showing that companies
with more than the average numbers of female directors score higher on MSCI's metric
for management of environmental, social and governance risks).
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meeting attendance rates.112
Studies also suggest hat other corporate stakeholders benefit from board
gender diversity. Companies with more gender diverse boards have more
women in their management ranks and a smaller gender wage gap.113 In
other words, boards with more female members have positive effects on the
career development of women at lower levels of the corporation, ultimately
helping to create a wider pipeline of female talent."4
Given the number of studies showing the benefits of board diversity on
board performance along several metrics, the business case against
homogeneity is becoming harder for corporations and investors alike to
ignore.
IV. STALLED PROGRESS: WHY VOLUNTARY DIVERSITY EFFORTS HAVE
FAILED
Part IV explains two predominant obstacles to women reaching the
boardroom, despite the business case for improving the gender diversity of
corporate boards.
A. Low Board Turnover & Overemphasis on Prior Board Experience
One reason that has been cited by corporate governance experts for slow
progress is the low turnover among corporate directors. With low turnover,
opportunities for increasing board diversity are limited. A study by the
Conference Board found that about half of companies in the S&P 500 and
Russell 3000 disclosed no change in their board makeup in 2018, similar to
112. See Lee, supra note 111, at 6 (showing that public companies with more women
on their boards are less likely to be hit by scandals such as bribery, fraud or shareholder
contests).
113. Higher levels of women on corporate boards correlate with higher levels of
women in management jobs and with lower levels of gender inequalities in pay. See Siri
Terijesen & Val. Singh, Female Presence on Corporate Boards: A Multi-Country Study
on Environmental Context, 83 J. Bus ETHIcs 55, 59 (2008). When boardrooms and
executive suites represent he demographics of the workforce, employees are more likely
to stay with the organization, and female and minority potential employees are more
likely to see the organization as an attractive employer. See Amy J. Hillman et al.,
Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards, 50 ACAD. OF MGMT. J., 941,
945 (2007); Mary C. Mattis, Women Directors: Progress and Opportunities for the
Future, 5 Bus. CONTEMP. World, 140, 148 (1993).
114. See Catherine H. Tinsley & Kate Purmal, Helping More Women Get CEO Jobs,
HARV. Bus. REV. (July 29, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/research-board-experience-
is-helping-more-women-get-ceo-jobs?utm medium=social&utm source=linkedin




the turnover rate in 2016.115 In other words, these companies neither added
a new director nor replaced an existing director. Further, one-fourth of
Russell 3000 directors stay in their positions for more than 15 years, and the
average tenure of an S&P 500 director is 12.7 years.116
When a seat did become available, only one-quarter of corporations
elected a first-time director who had never previously served on a public
company board. Corporations primarily look to candidates who have C-suite
experience or have previously served on a public company board when
filling a board seat vacancy, largely out of custom and not because of any
legal requirement or evidence to support the practice. There are no studies
indicating that such experience is linked to better corporate performance. On
the other hand, there are studies indicating that directors with prior
managerial experience may have biases in favor of management hat could
undermine their ability to be independent and objective, which are key
qualities of an effective director."7 Qualified candidates may need to have
a solid understanding of corporate affairs and financial matters in order to
effectively participate on a board, but candidates do not solely develop these
skills by sitting on boards or by serving as a CEO. The emphasis on prior
board experience acts as a barrier to women being considered for board
vacancies because f w women have this experience on their resumes.
The low turnover of board positions coupled with the Catch-22 emphasis
on prior board experience as a qualification to board service cannot be easily
overcome without a gender diversity mandate that forces corporations to stop
using the "lack of qualified" women excuse."s
115. See Despite Demand for More Diversity and Refreshment, Half of Russell
3000 Companies Report No Change in Board Composition, CONF. BD. (Apr. 24,
2019), https://www.conference-board.org/press/news/index.cfm?id=4983 1&mod=art
icle incline.
116. See Matteo Tonello, Corporate Board Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P
500, CONF. BD. (2019), https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/Insights/thought-leade
rship/Documents/TCB-Corporate-Board-Practices-2019.pdf.
117. See Fairfax, supra note 105, at 881 (citing Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay
Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 33-34
(2004)) (noting that directors who are executives or former executives may have biases
in favor of management).
118. See Fairfax, supra note 105, at 858 (examining the "pool problem" and finding
that the problem may be exaggerated).); See also Emily Chasan, BlackRock Is Sick of
Excuses for Corporate Boards Lacking Women, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-03/blackrock-is-sick-of-excuses-
for-corporate-boards-lacking-women. (quoting Michelle Edkins, BlackRock's global
head of stewardship, "Every man was a first-time director once. If someone took a bet
on an untrained director who happened to be a man, you can take a bet on an untrained
director who happens to be a woman.").
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B. Unconscious Gender Bias
Federal legislation did not guarantee equal employment opportunities for
women until the 1960s. Prior to the passage of Title VII, private employers
were free to discriminate against women in every aspect of the workplace.
More than forty years after its passage, women still face significant barriers
with each step up the corporate hierarchy.
Numerous studies confirm that deeply entrenched stereotypes,
discriminatory attitudes, and subconscious gender biases remain significant
barriers to women breaking through the "glass ceiling" and reaching the
upper echelons of corporate America."l9 Some scholars describe this as
"unconscious gender bias," which is the unintentional and automatic mental
associations based on gender, stemming from traditions, norms, values,
cultures and/or experiences.120
Research shows that both men and women overestimate male performance
and underestimate female performance. One Yale University study found
that both male and female scientists were more likely to hire men, consider
them more competent han women, and pay them $4,000 more per year than
women.121 Another study of employees of a large service organization found
even when there are no differences in performance appraisals, more men than
women received promotions.122 A study of business school graduates found
that women with an MBA degree from a top-twenty business school earned
12% less in her first year of employment than her male counterpart.23
Separately, a 2018 Georgetown University study found that men with
bachelor's degrees make an average of $26,000 more per year than women
119. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
613, 618 (2007) (detailing the social science data showing that subconscious biases lead
to women being held to higher standards, female resumes being evaluated less favorably,
and women internalizing the stereotypes and viewing themselves less qualified for
promotions and leadership positions); Jayne W. Barnard, More Women on Corporate
Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 713-14 (2007).
120. See Int'l Labour Org., ACT/EMP Research Note: Breaking Barriers:
Unconscious Gender Bias in the Workplace 3 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ilo.org
/wcmsp5/groups/public/---eddialogue/---act emp/documents/publication/wcms
601276.pdf.
121. See Margaretta Midura, John vs. Jennifer: A Battle ofthe Sexes, YALE SC. (Feb.
19, 2013), http://www.yalescientific.org/20 13/02/john-vs-jennifer-a-battle-of-the-
sexes/.
122. See IRIS BOHNET, WHAT WORKS: GENDER EQUALITY BY DESIGN (2016).





with the same credentials.12 4
Shareholder activism is also not immune from unconscious gender bias.
A 2017 study investigated the reasons that hedge fund activists seemingly
ignore evidence for gender-diverse boards in their choices for director
nominees and disproportionately target female chief executive officers.125
The authors suggest hat hedge funds may be subconsciously biased against
women leaders due to perceptions, cultural attitudes, and beliefs about the
attributes of leaders in our society. Activists may view female CEOs as weak
and may be more willing to second-guess and criticize the corporate strategic
plans put forth by women leaders. Indeed, one academic study found that
the persistent mention of a female CEO in media coverage leads to a 96%
probability that activists will target her company.12 6
Research shows that when directors are looking to fill open positions on
their board, they tend to favor people like themselves.127  So when the
majority of directors are white men, they are likely to favor, mentor, and
invest more in other white men.
Unconscious gender bias is entrenched in our culture. It is a significant
barrier to the advancement of women in corporate America and into
leadership roles more broadly. Unconscious gender bias is also difficult to
minimize and prevent without a strong regulatory framework. A gender
diversity mandate is an effective way to overcome unconscious gender bias
where other less stringent efforts have failed.128
124. See Anthony P. Carnevale et al., Women Can't Win: Despite Making Educational
Gains and Pursuing High-Wage Majors, Women Still Earn Less Than Men (2018), CTR.
oN EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/
WomenFRWeb.pdf.
125. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Activism and Board Diversity, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 17/09/29/activism-and-board-diversity/.
126. See id.
127. See Diversity in the Boardroom: Perspectives and Practices, DELOITTE 13
(2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/governance-
risk-compliance/ZABoardDiversity FullArticle.PDF (noting that an overwhelming
majority of companies turn to their own directors for board member recommendations).
128. See Siri Terjesen, Why Some Board Gender Quotas Don't Work, CATALYST
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.catalyst.org/2019/02/12/why-some-board-gender-quotas-
dont-work/ (noting that a large body of research suggests that governments enact aboard
gender quota if other soft measures such as target-setting fail to increase female
representation in the boardroom).
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V. A GENDER DIVERSITY LISTING STANDARD APPROACH
Globally, board gender diversity mandates are not new,12 9 but they have
become of more immediate import in the United States in light of the recent
transformative women's movements.13 0 Nations that are more successful at
nearing gender parity on corporate boards provide some guidance about what
would transform America's boardrooms. One of the greatest predictors of a
more gender-diverse board appears to be the strength of any regulation
mandating a minimum level of such diversity. Countries with the strongest
regulatory and enforcement regimes, paired with the most stringent and
binding quotas, are the most effective at increasing the representation of
women on corporate boards.131 For example, Norway and France, countries
with the highest percentage of female directors in the world, have strong laws
with strict gender quota mandates.132 The regulatory approach in California
129. See supra discussion and text accompanying note 27. Norway was the first
country to enforce a board gender quota in 2006, which required 40% female
representation. Iceland, France, and Spain also mandate 40%. Belgium, Italy, Germany,
and the Netherlands have lower gender quotas. See Inst. Shareholder Servs., Inc., Gender
Parity on Boards Around the World, HARv. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-
around-the-world/; Alison Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in
Boardrooms, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/
europe/german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-boards.html; Rosenblum,
supra note 28, at 1441-1442 (detailing corporate diversity quotas that have been
established abroad).
130. See supra Part II.B.
131. On the other hand, countries with the fewest percentage of female directors do
not have any gender diversity regulation. Countries with the lowest percentage of female
directors in the world include South Korea (2 .3 %), Japan (5%), Russia (5.4%), and
Greece (8.8%). See Inst. Shareholder Serws., Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the
World, HARv. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 17/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-
world/.
132. Norway's percentage of female directors is 4 2 .1% and France's is 36 .8%.
Norwegian law mandates strict quotas that depend on the size of the board: (i) if the
board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall be represented; (ii) if the
board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall be represented by at least two
members; (iii) if the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall be
represented by at least three members; (iv) if the board of directors has nine members,
each sex shall be represented by at least four members, and if the board of directors has
more members, each sex shall represent at least 40% of the members of the board; and
(v) the rules apply correspondingly for elections of deputy members of the board of
directors. See Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, § 6-1 la (Act No.
45/June 13, 1997) (Nor.); Inst. Shareholder Serws., Inc., Gender Parity on Boards




SB 826 is modeled after the quota-based approaches in Norway and France.
In the U.S., states are recognizing that a mandate approach may be
required because progress has been slow, and voluntary self-regulation
approaches have not proven to be sufficiently effective at achieving gender-
balanced boards. The question then becomes how to implement a mandate
in the U.S. that will pass constitutional muster and fit within the country's
political, economic, and cultural preferences for corporate freedom and
market-based approaches. The stock exchanges are best positioned to
impose a gender diversity mandate on publicly traded corporations through
new corporate governance listing standards.
Under this proposal, the major U.S. stock exchanges would develop listing
standards, subject to SEC approval,13 3 that would mandate a minimum
number of women directors on the boards of the companies listed on their
exchanges. 134 The listing standards would be based on best practice
world/. The French law requires listed companies or non-listed companies (with revenues
or total assets of over EUR fifty million and employing at least 500 persons for the last
three years) to have a proportion of men or women that is at least 40%. See Loi 2011-
103 du 27janvier 2011 relative A representation 6quilibr6e des femees et des hommes
au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et A l'6galit6 professionnelle
[Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on Equal Representation of Women and Men
on Corporate Boards and on Equality in the Workplace], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, at
1680. Finland does not have specific quotas but instead has in place "softer" laws that
mandate the presence of women on corporate boards, and Sweden uses a public
disclosure approach. Since 2016, the Finnish corporate code stipulates that both women
and men be represented on listed company boards, and listed companies are required to
report on their objectives and initiatives to ensure that both women and men are
represented. See FIN. SEC. MKT. Ass'n, Finnish Corporate Governance Code (2015),
https://cgfinland.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2015/10/hallinnointikoodi-2015eng.pdf.
Since 2015, Sweden's corporate code requires that board nomination committees strive
for gender balance in their proposals regarding board composition and provide the public
with explanations of their proposals. See SWED. CORP. Governance Bd., The Swedish
Corporate Governance Code (2016), http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se
/UserFiles/Archive/496/TheSwedish Corporate_GovernanceCode_1_December_201
6.pdf.
133. Under Sections 19(b) and 19(c) of the Exchange Act, the SEC would need to find
consistency with the requirements of the Exchange Act in order to approve of an
exchange-established gender diversity listing standard. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (2019).
134. By setting a minimum number, companies would have flexibility to choose the
total number of women on their board and decide whether to expand the total number of
board seats to allow for the addition of women board members. Importantly though,
gender parity requires a critical mass of women on a board. Studies have shown that the
inclusion of one or two women as token minority representatives was both ineffective
and harmful to equality and inclusion efforts.
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guidelines and be formulated with input from various stakeholders such as
investors, listed companies, corporate governance experts, and advocacy
groups. The listing standards would also be tailored to allow for corporate
control and to accommodate differences between companies, yet still be
effective at increasing the number of women on publicly traded corporate
boards by virtue of being a mandate. The listing standards would be strictly
enforced by the exchanges through fines and threats of delisting. The
exchanges would also require periodic public disclosure of board diversity
figures to ensure compliance. This proposal aims to address the board
gender diversity problem while taking advantage of the strengths and
expertise of the exchanges.
Critics of a gender diversity listing standard approach may argue that it
adds to the cost of becoming or remaining a public company.13 5 As we have
seen with any new regulation of private markets, there will always be upfront
concerns about regulating corporations because the costs are more direct and
easier to calculate than the benefits. It is also likely that the regulation
becomes cost effective over time as more women reach senior positions.13 6
Notably, the overall cost of underrepresentation of women to the economy
is difficult to quantify because the costs are likely indirect.13 7 Finally, the
cost burden involved in recruiting women directors is not articulated with
any specificity relative to the costs associated with ongoing disclosure
requirements or enhanced governance duties currently required of listed
*138
companies.
135. SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce made this argument with respect to board
diversity mandates generally in her remarks before the Society for Corporate Governance
National Conference. See Hester M. Pierce, Baby on Board: Remarks Before the
Society for Corporate Governance National Conference, SEC (June 28, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/baby-board-remarks-corporate-governance-national-
conference -062819.
136. Recruiting costs may decrease as more women enter the leadership pipeline and
corporations invest in developing such pipeline. Ten years on from Norway's quota for
women on corporate boards, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/business/2018/02/17/ten-years-on-from-norways-quota-for-women-on-
corporate-boards (showing numbers of women on boards have increased since Norway's
mandate).
137. But see Kweilin Ellingrud et al., How Reducing Gender Inequality Could Boost
U.S. GDP by $2.1 Trillion, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://hbr.org/
2016/04/how-reducing-gender-inequality-could-boost-u-s-gdp-by-2-1-trillion (finding
that if there was parity between the sexes in the workplace, the United States economy
would earn approximately $4.3 trillion more between 2016 and 2025).
138. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Sarbanes- Oxley Debacle:




Critics of a gender diversity listing standard approach may also argue that
it interferes with private contracting rights of corporations and its
shareholders. Some corporate scholars assert that corporate governance
arrangements are matters of private ordering, and shareholders and directors
can arrange their governance structure more efficiently than regulators.'39
This argument relies on the premise that shareholders are providing actual
consent to the corporation's directors, but as others have argued,
shareholders' consent is often coerced or ignorant.140 This argument also
ignores the exchanges' self-identified role in encouraging "high standards of
corporate democracy."141 From time to time, exchanges step in to adjust for
market inefficiencies, externalities, and obstacles.
Putting these critiques aside, the proposal raises two legal issues with
respect o the exchanges' authority to adopt gender diversity listing standards
under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act and under the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution.
A. Section 19(b) Exchange Act Analysis
As discussed at Part II.A., corporate governance listing standards require
approval by the SEC before they can become effective. Under Section 19(b)
of the Exchange Act, in order to approve an exchange-established listing
standard, the SEC needs to find consistency with the requirements of the
Exchange Act. When the exchanges have made the most dramatic changes
to their corporate governance listing standards, they have typically followed
a strong push from the SEC and a negotiation with the SEC over the new
requirements until both parties are satisfied. However, the proposal here
would not follow this protocol.
Given the limited case law in this area, it is difficult to define with
precision the authority of the exchanges with respect o corporate governance
matters.142  However, from a governance perspective, the proposal is
139. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1442 (1989).
140. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CoRP. L. 819, 824 (1999).
141. See NYSE, Listed Company Manual (2019), https://nyseguide.srorules.com
/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeld=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-
PHC-0%o7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9Fl7057DFO%7D--
WKUS TAL_5667%23teid-0 (noting that listing standards are aimed at "maintaining
appropriate standards of corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to
shareholders").
142. The Business Roundtable decision limited the scope of SEC authority with
respect to disapproving proposed listing standards as long as it is satisfied that any
differences in the application of the listing standards are based on meaningful distinctions
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analogous to the independent director listing standards for which the
NASDAQ and NYSE received SEC approval and implemented following
the corporate accounting scandals in the early 2000s.14 3 The SEC approved
the independent director listing standards and found the listing standards to
meet the consistency standard.44  The governance goal of the proposed
listing standards is similar to that of the independent director listing
standards; both change the composition of a listed company's board in order
to improve the board's oversight function, decision-making, and overall
performance. The proposal, like that of the independence standards, relates
to the maintenance of integrity of the securities markets and fairness to
investors by promoting investor confidence in the monitoring role of the
board and by providing reliability in the level of diversity mandated. Gender
diversity listings standards fall within the right of the exchanges to establish
quantitative standards for their respective markets.
B. Equal Protection Clause Analysis
1. Justiciability
Before reaching the merits of an equal protection challenge and assuming
the court has jurisdiction, claimants must show they have ajusticiable claim.
Claimants other than the companies themselves will have barriers to
standing.145 The Constitution requires a claimant to have suffered an "injury-
in-fact" that was caused by the allegedly unconstitutional government
action.14 6 A shareholder plaintiff would have to argue that encroachment on
shareholder voting rights is the "injury-in-fact," while a potential male board
member plaintiff would have to argue that he was deprived of the opportunity
to sit on the company's board because of his gender. Neither of these
arguments is likely to overcome the barriers to standing because the listing
between issuers and are not unfairly discriminatory. See supra Part II.A.
143. See supra discussion and text accompanying notes 100-101.
144. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange
Related to its Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 21, 1999);
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers Related to its Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (Dec. 21,
1999).
145. Corporations affected by the law likely will not have the appetite to sue over the
gender diversity listing standards given the potential public-relations challenge of being
seen as a company that does not support gender diversity. This has proven to be the case
in California; to date, no corporation has challenged SB 826.
146. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
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standard imposes obligations on the company, not its shareholders.14 7
Further, the impact of the listing standard on male board members likely
amounts to benign differential treatment.48
2. Government Action
Another threshold matter claimants must meet is the government action
requirement. The equal protection clause only applies to the government, so
the conduct giving rise to an alleged violation of the equal protection clause
must be considered government action. The implementation of gender
diversity listing standards by the securities exchanges could face a viable
equal protection challenge if the actions of the exchanges are attributed to
the government,14 9 but there likely is not sufficient state action to mount a
successful case.
The securities exchanges began as private membership organizations, but
have since become integrated into the administration of the Exchange Act
and are subject to SEC oversight. They are treated as private entities under
certain circumstances and as quasi-government entities under other
circumstances. However, constitutional restraints on private action depend
on the link between the private ntity and the government. '5 Restrictions on
private action based on constitutional guarantees are only valid if there is a
147. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Meland's
challenge to SB 826 in Me/land v. Padilla based on a failure to show an "injury in fact."
The shareholder plaintiff's argument was that he was being forced to vote for directors
in a gender conscious way, but the district court concluded that the shareholders had no
standing to bring suit. The court ruled that the shareholder could cast his votes for any
board nominee so his voting rights were not impaired.
148. Courts have encouraged benign discrimination to overcome past discrimination
and exclusion. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Greenv. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
149. Note that when parties have challenged the actions of an SRO on constitutional
grounds, the focus of their disputes have been on illegal seizures inviolation of the Fourth
Amendment and denials of due process or compelled testimony in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. See Steven J. Cleveland, The NYSE as State Actor: Rational Actors,
Behavioral Insights & Joint Investigations, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2005).
150. The state action doctrine requires action on the part of a state actor to affect a
constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000)
("action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action
as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." (quoting Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("With a few exceptions, such as the
provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, constitutional guarantees of individual liberty
and equal protection do not apply to the actions of private entities.").
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sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged action
such that the behavior of the private entity may be fairly attributed to the
government.'5 1 While the state action cases have been contradictory and
fact-specific, in making such a determination of whether quasi-private
behavior constitutes state action, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the
extent of the government's coercion or encouragement, willful and joint
participation, delegation of a public function, and entwinement in the
management or control of the private actor to achieve governmental
objectiveS.152
Relevant to this inquiry is the relative independence of the exchanges from
government interference.5 3 Importantly, governmental regulation by itself
does not turn a private actor's actions into those of the state.5 4 The securities
exchanges have a well-established tradition of self-regulation. It was not
until the Great Depression that Congress imposed government supervision
151. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) (finding that state action may only be found if the actions of a private organization
are appropriately treated as having been caused by the state itself); Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (finding that whether the entity and state are
sufficiently intertwined may require a detailed inquiry because the nature of the state's
involvement may not be readily apparent).
152. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296. But see id. at 295 ("What [private actions
are] fairly attributable [to the government] is a matter of normative judgment, and the
criteria lack rigid simplicity."); Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632
(1991) (O'Connor J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency."). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 886 (1987) ("[H]ow does one
decide whether government is acting? The legal test could in theory depend on whether
government agents are involved in the process. But ... such a test would be inadequate.
State officials are involved in the enforcement of private contract, tort, and property law
every day, and their involvement does not subject all private arrangements to
constitutional constraints.") (internal quotation mark omitted).
153. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 288 (finding the actions of a private
association with 84% of its members state employees acting in their official capacity and
controlling the board of directors to be sufficient for a finding of state action).
154. See Jacksonv. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-58 (1974) (finding no such
nexus between the state and a public utility's action in terminating service to a customer
despite the facts that the utility was subject to state regulation, the state had conferred in
effect a monopoly status upon the utility, and in reviewing the company's tariff schedules
the regulatory commission had in effect approved the termination provision); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Ivis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (finding no state action where a liquor
license was issued to a private club that refused to serve African Americans). See also
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (noting that state action may be found if
"[the State] has exercised such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must . .. be deemed to be that of the State.").
532
FEMALE BOARDROOM
over the exchanges through the Exchange Act. Further, the Exchange Act
emphasizes elf-regulation as the primary means of controlling the securities
industry.
While early court decisions classified the actions of self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), such as the stock exchanges, as state action, since the
1960s, courts have routinely concluded that the actions of stock exchanges
should not be attributed to the government.15 5 Further, no recent decisions
have attributed the actions of a securities exchange to the government.
Under this Article's proposal, state action likely does not exist because the
extent of the SEC's action would be allowing the exchanges to establish the
listing standards under applicable law. Under the proposal, exchanges would
establish the listing standards on their own accord, in pursuit of their own
interests to account for the preferences and concerns of the companies whose
securities are traded and the investors that are trading those securities, not
through any coercion or encouragement by the SEC or other state actor.
Since exchanges generate revenue on listings and trades executed on the
exchange, they should seek to attract issuers and investors by responding to
the expressed preferences and concerns of the public regarding gender
diversity.
Further, as was noted in Business Roundtable, the SEC's role in approving
corporate governance listing standards is limited.15 6 The Exchange Act
establishes the SEC's approval process, and the exchanges would merely be
seeking approval of the SEC pursuant to the statute. Regulatory schemes
and requirements do not automatically impose constitutional restraints on
private action. Given the SEC's limited role in the development and
approval of exchange-established listing standards, the proposal cannot face
155. See Cleveland, supra note 149, at 20-22 (summarizing the development of the
state action jurisprudence with respect to SROs); Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities
Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations be Considered Government Agencies, 14 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 171-183 (2008) (discussing cases addressing the NASD's and
NYSE's immunity from suit, Fifth Amendment claims, and compulsory arbitration); see,
e.g., Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d. Cir.
1999); see also Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding
comprehensive regulation of securities exchanges by the federal government by itself
does not urn exchanges into governmental actors); U.S. v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 868-
69 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the argument that the NYSE was "in effect the arm of the
Government in administering portions of the Securities Exchange Act."); but see Rooms
v. SEC, 444 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that due process requirements
apply to enforcement actions of the National Association of Securities Dealers, a SRO).
Note that the U.S. Supreme Court has not reviewed the issue of state action in the context
of a SRO.
156. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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a successful equal protection challenge without a finding of state action.
Failure to satisfy the government action requirement normally results in
dismissal without reaching the merits of the equal protection claim.
3. Merits of an Equal Protection Clause Violation
If the claimants can show that the government harmed them enough to
create ajusticiable claim, a court could then proceed to the merits of an equal
protection challenge. Facial classifications such as the mandate proposed in
the gender diversity listing standard are subject to the equal protection
clause. Classifications based on gender must meet intermediate scrutiny, or
be substantially related to an important government interest.157 The Court
has recognized remedying the effects of past discrimination as a sufficiently
important interest o satisfy intermediate scrutiny.15 s Thanks to the #MeToo
movement, sex discrimination in corporate America has never been more
visible. Women remain underrepresented on corporate boards in proportion
to their percentage of the general population because of systemic bias,
structural impediments and gendered norms.159 A gender diversity listing
standard should be viewed as a way to combat the entrenched prejudice and
systemic barriers women face as they attempt to advance within companies.
The government's justification of equity, proportional representation and
balanced power would be considered important in the context of reversing
systemic inequity in corporate leadership.
With respect to satisfying the substantial relation test, the Court requires
the means to be substantially effective and narrowly tailored. The Court has
not found facial quotas in the context of race narrowly tailored, and thus are
unconstitutional under U.S. jurisprudence.16 0 The same reasoning could be
used as a rationale to strike down a gender diversity listing standard. Quotas
in affirmative action cases are often considered in the public university
context based on racial and ethnic classifications.161 However, the case law
157. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); cf Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
158. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)) (stating
that "sex classifications may be used to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities suffered,' to 'promote equal employment opportunity,' and to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.").
159. See supra, notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
160. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309, 334 (2003) (reaffirming that quotas
are unconstitutional and violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
161. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 224 (2003); Fisherv. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013),
534
FEMALE BOARDROOM
on quotas in the affirmative action context is not directly applicable to the
mandate proposed in the gender diversity listing standard.
First, the constitutional standard of review for race-based classifications is
strict scrutiny while intermediate scrutiny is used for sex-based
classifications.162 This could mean a greater tolerance for gender-based
quotas than race-based quotas. Further, the election of directors to corporate
boards differs substantially from the admissions policies used by
universities. Universities typically have a set number of seats available for
an incoming class. Common affirmative action programs are ones that set
aside a set number of seats for minority groups or ones that use a point system
to evaluate students, where minority students are preferentially awarded a set
number of points.163 Setting aside admissions seats for one group could
result in an equally qualified member of another group being denied
admission on account of race. On the other hand, corporate boards are able
to expand the number of their board seats such that adding a women director
does not necessarily foreclose the opportunity of a male director to sit on the
board, nor does it provide an absolute bar to his appointment to the board. 164
While the Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of facial
quotas in the gender context, it has shown openness to gender-based
classifications that are remedial in nature and aimed at reversing systemic
inequality.
A gender diversity listing standard as proposed in this Article would likely
sustain a constitutional challenge when analyzed under intermediate scrutiny
and when found to be a remedy for the rampant inequities, harmful gender
norms, and pervasive sexual harassment and discrimination found in the
power structures of America's corporations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent political and cultural developments in the United States have
renewed interest in corporate board diversity initiatives. However, the
aff'd, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015), aff'd, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015).
162. But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (plurality
preferring to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications).
163. These were the programs at issue in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke and in Gratz v. Bollinger, respectively. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
164. Indeed, the Court has shown a willingness to consider gender quotas to achieve
gender parity. It upheld an employer's affirmative action plan with gender preferences
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
641-62 (1987).
2020]
536 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 28:4
boardroom gender gap has proven to be systemic and persistent despite the
mobilization of shareholders and stakeholders. Simply asking companies to
diversify their boards has resulted in companies paying lip service to
diversity instead of forcing systemic change. Boardroom gender mandates
are necessary to create faster and sustained increases in gender diversity of
public company boards.
Boardroom gender mandates have proven to be transformative with
respect to gender parity in European countries, but the judicial fate of such
mandates in the United States remains in question. The national securities
exchanges, operating as private regulators, offer an avenue around the
constitutional hurdles raised by SB 826 and are best positioned to address
the gender diversity problem in America's boardrooms.
